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NOTES AND RECENT DECISIONS
PEOPLE EX REL. OGILVIE V. LEWIS,
A PROCEDURE FOR THE ENACTMENT OF
ANTICIPATORY LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

The idea of revising the organic instrument of a state is
peculiarly American.1 The doctrine of Popular Sovereignty2 had

a strong appeal to the inhabitants of the Colonies in the latter
half of the 18th Century. The people were sovereign;3 it followed that they could make a constitution4 and revise or amend
the document already adopted.-

Any constitutional revision, however, whether by amendment or convention, has always presented difficulties which naturally arise from a change in a state's most basic legal foundation.6 The enactment of legislation in anticipation of the removal of constitutional limitations has long been a particularly

troublesome area. 7 The interim between the adoption and the
effective date of a superseding constitution or constitutional
amendment has typically created a conflict for the legislature.
'Changes were made in the English constitution by act of Parliament
and there was no distinction in form between organic and statutory legislation. And though the Colonists were familiar with the English system, they
chose not to follow it. Consequently, there developed an idea that was pethe idea that an instrument of government should
culiarly American make provision for its orderly amendment. Martig, Amending the Constitution, Article Five; The Keystone of the Arch, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1253 (1937).
2 See
BARKER, SOCIAL CONTRACT, ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND
ROUSSEAU (1968) ; RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 623-32
(10th ed. 1964) ; Laski, The Theory of Popular Sovereignty, 17 MICH. L.
REV. 201 (1919).
3See Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776; MENTOR, FEDERALIST
PAPERS (8th ed. 1961) Nos. 28, 39, 59.
4U.S. CONST. Preamb.; ILL. CONST. Preamb. (1970); ILL. CONST.
Preamb. (1870) ; ILL. CONST. Preamb. (1848); ILL. CONST. Preamb. (1818);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849) ; Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
5 U.S. CONST. art. V; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, H§ 1, 2 (1970) ; ILL. CONST.
art. XIV, §§ 1, 2 (1870) ; ILL. CONST. art. XII, Hi 1, 2 (1848) ; ILL. CONST.
See ORFIELD, AMENDING TIlE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
art. VII, § 1 (1818).
(1942).
6 See Goodwin, How Should the Illinois Constitution Be Amended?, 9
ILL. L. REV. 601 (1915) ; Kopp, The Illinois Constitution: An Orientation,
17 DE PAUL L. REV. 480 (1968) ; Lavery, Revising a Constitution, 15 ILL. L.
REV. 437 (1921) ; Price, Urbanism and a New State Constitution, 17 DR
PAUL L. REV. 532 (1968); Witwer, The Shape of the Illinois Con.stitutin,
17 DE PAUL L. REV. 467 (1968).
7 The earliest American case on the subject of anticipatory legislation is
Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119 (1839). In that case the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of legislation enacted in anticipation of a
proposed amendment to the Connecticut Constitution. The court's lengthy
discussion of the merits of anticipatory legislation, however, was dictum
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Although a general assembly is bound by the limiting provisions
under the old constitution until the new one becomes effective,8
it also, in order to insure an orderly transition, is faced with the
task of enacting legislation which will become effective imme-

diately after the new constitution or constitutional amendment
goes into full force.9 Thus, while practical considerations warrant the enactment of anticipatory legislation, binding constitutional limitations inhibit the power of the legislature to effectively enact for the future.
Specifically, the controversy with respect to anticipatory
legislation has centered around the fact that though enacted to
become law only after the invalidating constitutional provisions
have been removed, such legislation is nonetheless unconstitutional under the constitution in effect at the time the legislature
undertakes to act. The power of a general assembly to override
present constitutional limitations in anticipation of their re-

moval has been the subject of much conflicting law. Though
most of the jurisdictions which have considered the question accord on the fact that anticipatory legislation is both proper and
necessary, the cases on the subject are inconsistent with respect

to the procedure which must be followed by the legislature to
insure the constitutionality of such anticipatory enactments. 10
PEOPLE EX REL. OGILVIE v. LEWIS,

A QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN ILLINOIS
Although the need for a comprehensive constitutional revi-

sion had become apparent to the majority of the Illinois electorate in the latter part of 1968,11 the adoption of the 1970 Constisince the case held that the Act in question would have been valid under the

constitution in effect at the time of its passage without the necessity for an
amendment thereto.
8 Unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions operate as limitations upon the lawmaking powers possessed by state legislatures. In Railroad
Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 672-73 (1872) the Court
stated:
It is true that, in construing the Federal Constitution, Congress must be
held to have only those powers which are granted expressly or by necessary implication, but the opposite rule is the one to be applied to the
construction of a State Constitution. The legislature of a state may exercise all powers which are properly legislative, unless they are forbidden by the State or National Constitution.
9 In People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 483-84, 274 N.E.2d 87,
92 (1971) the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Such legislation is necessary in some cases to supplement new constitutional provisions which are not self-executing and in other cases to
insure an orderly and efficient transition from the old to the new constitution and a continuity in the operation of government.
10 The disharmony relates to the point in time at which anticipatory
legislation may be constitutionally enacted. While some courts are of the
opinion that such legislation is valid no matter when enacted, others have
held that anticipatory legislation is valid only if enacted after the proposed
constitutional revisions have been formally ratified. See cases collected
under 171 A.L.R. 1075 (statute anticipating constitutional amendment).
11 After the early 1960s, the cumulative effects of generations of effort
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tution created problems never before faced by the Illinois judiciary. The recent case of People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis," raised
the question of the validity of anticipatory legislation in Illinois
for the first time. 13 In Ogilvie, the constitutionality of the Transportation Bond Act, 14 an act passed by the General Assembly in
anticipation of the already ratified but not yet effective 1970
Constitution, was challenged on the ground that the Act violated
certain provisions of the 1870 Constitution, in effect at the time
the Bond Act was passed by the General Assembly. In upholding the constitutionality of the Transportation Bond Act under
the 1970 Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court delineated the
procedural guidelines to be followed by the General Assembly in
the enactment of anticipatory legislation. Under the Ogilvie
doctrine, anticipatory legislation will be tested under the old
constitution unless the new constitution has been ratified at the
time the General Assembly undertakes to act. 15
Facts in Ogilvie
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 was adopted by the Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention- on September 3, 1970. It
led to demands for a convention which would undertake the modernization
of the 1870 Constitution.
In 1965, the General Assembly created the Constitution Study Commission charged to determine whether a new constitution or only a partial
revision was needed. The Commission ultimately recommended a convention. The call was put to public referendum by a unanimous Senate and
near-unanimous House.
In 1968, the non-partisan, civic Illinois Committee for a Constitutional
Convention effectively coordinated the support of dozens of organizations.
The convention won the support of the State's major news media, both major
political parties, virtually all public office incumbents, as well as their challengers, and scores of organizations and individuals.
The 1870 Constitution was in itself perhaps the strongest force behind
voter approval of the convention in November 1968. Nearly a century of
experience provided one clear and simple conclusion - that a new constitution was needed desperately. The old one was too rigid and detailed. The
state was forced increasingly to seek ways around its unworkable Constitution which became a system of evasions, circumventions and at times downright violations of clear mandates of the basic law.
Sixty percent of all voters in the 1968 general election voted in favor
of the convention. The 2.9 million favorable vote was the greatest ever
given any proposition or candidate in Illinois history. It was an overwhelming mandate for comprehensive constitutional reform.
On December 15, 1970, at a special election held for that purpose, the
proposed constitution was ratified by the people by a vote of 1,122,425 to
838,168. Witwer, Introduction to the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
CONST. art. I at xiii to xx.

S.H.A.

49 Ill. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d 87 (1971).
13The constitutionality of anticipatory legislation had not before been
questioned in Illinois for the practical reason that the 1848 and 1870 Constitutions became effective very shortly after their ratification by the people.
People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 482, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
The 1848 Constitution was ratified on March 6, 1848 and became effective
on the first day of April of that year. The 1870 Constitution was ratified
on July 2, 1870 and became effective on August 8, 1870. See ILL. CONST.
Adoption Schedule (1870); ILL. CONST. Adoption Schedule (1848).
14ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 701 et seq. (1971).
15 49 Ill. 2d 476, 483, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
16 The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention consisted of 116 mem12
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was ratified by the people on December -15 of the same year, and
became generally effective' on July 1, 1971.18 The Transportation Bond Act was enacted by the 77th General Assembly on
June 28, 1971, three days before the 1.970 Constitution became
effective, but after its ratificationby the people of this State. The
anticipatory nature of the Act was apparent from its Preamble:
An Act in anticipation of the effective date of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 and to implement, in part, Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution."9
The Act further provided:
This Act having been passed in anticipation of the effective
date of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and to implement, in fact,
Article XIII, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, shall
go into full force and effect upon July 1, 1971 or upon the date
when the Governor signs this Act into law if such signing occurs

after July 1, 1971.20
The Act was approved by the governor and thereupon became
law on July 2, 1971, one day after the 1970 Constitution became
effective. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, 21 Richard B.
Ogilvie, then Governor of Illinois, determined that a number of
the transportation bonds should be sold at the earliest possible
time and directed John W. Lewis, then Secretary of State, to
prepare advertisements for purchase bids as provided by the
Act.2 2 Lewis refused to comply on the ground that there were
serious questions concerning the validity of the Transportation
Bond Act under the constitutions of both the United States and
the State of Illinois. 23 Governor Ogilvie, as petitioner, filed an
original action in the Illinois Supreme Court24 seeking a writ of
mandamus 2 5 directing Secretary Lewis, respondent, to take
all necessary action as directed by petitioner in connection
with the issuance and sale of bonds as authorized by the Transportation Bond Act.26 Among other contentions made but not
bers, two elected from each of the fifty-eight Senatorial Districts in the
State.
"7 ILL. CONST. transition schedule (1970).
'S ILL. CONST. adoption schedule (1970).
19 Transportation Bond Act, Preamble, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 701 et
seq. (1971). ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 provides:
Public transportation is an essential public purpose for which public funds may be expended. The General Assembly by law may provide

for, aid, and assist public transportation, including the granting of pub-

lic funds or credit to any corporation or public authority authorized to
provide public transportation within the State.
20 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 712 (1971).
2
1 d § 704.

22

Id.

2d 476, 478, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
24 Pursuant to ILL. SUP. CT. R. 381(a) (1971).
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 87 (1971).
2649 Ill. 2d 476, 478, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
23 49Ill.
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commented upon here, 27 Respondent Lewis set forth the argu-

ment that the constitutionality of the Act should be determined
under the 1870 Constitution, in effect at the time the Act was
passed by the General Assembly, and not under the 1970 Con-

stitution, in effect at the time the Act became law-V.2'

As stated

by the court:
The underlying issue is whether the legislature has power to enact
legislation to anticipate and be tested by an already ratified but
not yet effective constitution even though the legislation possibly
may not have been valid if tested by the constitution in effect at
29
the time of its passage.

Although a question of first impression in Illinois,

30

antici-

patory legislation had long been a source of disharmony among

the state courts, which had expressed conflicting opinions with
respect to the procedure by which the legislature could constitutionally anticipate the removal of limitations upon its lawmaking
power. While a number of jurisdictions struck down anticipatory legislation as an unconstitutional expansion of legislative

power, 31 others placed virtually no restrictions upon its enact-

ment. 32 There being no recognized authority on the subject, the
law with respect to anticipatory legislation lingered in a state of

conflicting and often confusing opinions for almost a century.3 3
When, in 1925, the United States Supreme Court handed down
27 Respondent made a total of seven arguments urging the unconstitutionality of the Transportation Bond Act. While only one is commented
upon here, it should be noted that the following contentions were also made:
1 -That
the Act did not set forth the specific purposes of the law as
required by art. IX, § 9(b) of the 1970 Constitution, and that it appropriated public funds for a non-public purpose in violation of art. VIII, § 1(a)
of the 1970 Constitution.
2 -That
the Act was not confined to one subject and was therefore
violative of art. IV, § 8(d) of the 1970 Constitution.
3- That the Act did not set forth the manner of repayment of the
transportation bonds and therefore violated art. IX, § 9(b) of the 1970
Constitution.6

4-That the Act constituted a continuing appropriation and that as
such it violated art. IV, § 8(d), and art. VIII, § 2(b) of the 1970 Constitution.
5 - That the Act provided for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the governor.
6- That the Act was invalid in that it was vague and indefinite.
The court considered all of the above stated arguments and found them to
be without merit.
2849 Ill. 2d 476, 482, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
29 Id.

30 Note 13 supra.

31 Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912)
In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 A.2d 400 (Me. 1968) ; In re Opinion of
the Justices, 137 Me. 350, 19 A.2d 53 (1941) ; In re Opinion of the Justices,
132 Me. 519, 174 A. 845 (1933); Watson v. Miller, 55 Tex. 289 (1881).
32Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926)
Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119 (1839) ; Fullam v. Brock. 271 N.C. 145, 155
S.E.2d 737 (1967) ; In re Thaxton, 78 N.M. 668, 437 P.2d 129 (1968);
Application of Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority, 360 P.2d 720 (Okla.
1961) ; State v. Hecker, 109 Ore. 520, 221 P. 808 (1923).
3 See cases collected under 171 A.L.R. 1075; 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitu-
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4
uniformity seemed at hand.
its decision in Drugganv. Anderson,3

DRUGGAN AND ITS LEGACY,

A

TALE OF CONFUSION

In Druggan v. Anderson, the petitioner was imprisoned for
contempt for disobeying a temporary injunction issued under
Section 22 of Title II of the National Prohibition Act, 35 an act
passed by the Congress in anticipation of the already ratified but
not yet effective eighteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. From an order dismissing his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus he appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Petitioner argued that since the eighteenth amendment had not
gone into effect at the time of the passage of the Act in question,
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact it.36 The
argument was flatly rejected. In upholding the constitutionality
of the Act, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
The grant of power to Congress is a present grant . . . no
reason has been suggested why the Constitution may not give Congress a present power to enact laws intended to carry out constitufor the future when the time comes for them to
tional provisions
7
take effect.
Having resolved the question of law presented in the case, 38 however, the Court added by way of dictum:
Indeed it would be going far to say that while the fate of the
Amendment was uncertain Congress could not have passed a law in
aid of it, conditioned upon the ratification taking placeA0
The dictum proved to be unfortunate, for while the case
became precedent on the subject of anticipatory legislation, it
was later interpreted by a number of courts as authority for the
proposition that anticipatory legislation was valid no matter
when enacted.
40
In Application of Oklahoma IndustrialFinance Authority,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, citing Druggan as authority, upheld legislation enacted in anticipation of a not yet ratified
amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution. Therein the court
stated:
We therefore hold that there is no constitutional inhibition
forbidding the enactment of an enabling act to become effective
tional Law § 180; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 47.
34 269 U.S. 36 (1925).
35 Act of Oct. 28, 1919 ch. 85, § 22, 41 Stat. 314.
36 269 U.S. 36, 38 (1925).
87 Id. at 39.
88 The question of law in Druggan was whether Congress had the
power to enact legislation in anticipation of an already ratified but not yet

effective amendment to the United States Constitution, such legislation to
take effect only after the enabling amendment became effective.
39 269 U.S. 36, 39 (1925).
40 360 P.2d 720 (Okla. 1961).
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at a future date when and if a proposed constitutional amendment
41
is adopted.

Again in Henson v. Gdorgia Industrial Realty Company, the
Georgia Supreme Court, also relying on Druggan, upheld legis-

lation enacted in anticipation of a proposed but not yet ratified
amendment to the Georgia Constitution.

The same result ob-

tained in In re Thaxton43 and in a number of other cases4 4 which,
under the authority of the Druggan dictum, sanctioned the legislature's disregard of effective constitutional limitations on its
lawmaking power. Though the holding in Druggan stood only
for the proposition that anticipatory legislation was permissible
when enacted after the enabling constitutional provisions had
been ratified,45 whatever uniformity that decision could have afforded the state courts was obviated by its dictum. Instead of
settling the controversy, Druggan merely cumulated it; for after
that decision the law with respect to anticipatory legislation remained as obscure as it had been in the past.
PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF ANTICIPATORY LEGISLATION

Although the power of a general assembly to legislatively
anticipate a future event or contingency has been held to be beyond question, 46 the courts have differed with respect to the procedure by which legislative power could be constitutionally anticipated to create a valid law.
Since the discordance specifically relates to the point in time
at which anticipatory legislation may be enacted 4 7 the opinions on
the subject may be divided into two categories: those that distinguish between pre and post ratification anticipatory legislation, 4
Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965).
43 78 N.M. 668, 437 P.2d 129 (1968).
44 Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926);
Busch v. Turner, 26 Cal. 2d 817, 161 P.2d 456 (1945); Fullam v. Brock,
271 N.C. 145, 155 S.E.2d 737 (1967); Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N.M. 496,
469 P.2d 141 (1970) (dictum).
45 Inasmuch as the act in Druggan was passed by the Congress after
the eighteenth amendment had been duly ratified by the states, any utterances by the Court with respect to pre ratification anticipatory legislation
would be at best judicial dictum.
46 Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City Council, 168 Cal. App. 2d 765,
336 P.2d 273 (1959) ; City of Miami Beach v. Lansburgh, 218 So. 2d 519
(Fla. 1969); Telford v. City of Gainesville, 208 Ga. 56, 65 S.E.2d 246
(1951); People v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N.E. 108 (1931); Eisele v.
Morton Park District, 122 Ill. App. 2d 226, 258 N.E.2d 127 (1970); People
v. Kearse, 56 Misc. 2d 586, 289 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1968) ; County School Board
v. Town of Herndon, 194 Va. 810, 75 S.E.2d 474 (1953).
41

42

47 Note 10 supra.

48 Neisel v. Moran. 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346 (1919); Terrebonne Parish
Sch. Bd. v. St. Mary Parish Sch. Bd., 242 La. 667, 138 So. 2d 104 (1962)
(dictum); Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So. 2d 508 (1941)
(dictum); Peck v. Tugwell, 199 La. 125, 5 So. 2d 524 (1941) (dictum);
Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912); In re
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and those that do not. 49 The latter type may be said to follow
the position taken by the dictum in Druggan, while the former
may be said to follow Druggan's decisive 'utterance.
The view taken by courts which do not distinguish between
the times at which anticipatory legislation is enacted has been
that legislation, which is unauthorized under an effective constitution but enacted in anticipation of the removal of constitutional
limitations, is valid no matter when enacted; provided that such
legislation becomes effective only after the constitutional limita5
50
In Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, '
tions have been removed.
a suit challenging the validity of the then newly enacted Work-

men's Compensation Act,52- the contention was made that since at

the time of the passage of the Act in question the Arizona Legislature lacked the power under the state constitution to pass such

a bill, it could not enact a valid law on the subject which would
become effective upon the adoption of a not yet ratified constitutional amendment removing the limitations. 5 3 In upholding the
validity of the Act in question, the Arizona Supreme Court cited
the dictum in Druggan and went on to say:
In Druggan v. Anderson ... the Court says:
'Indeed, it would be going far to say that while the fate
of the amendment was uncertain Congress could not have
passed a law in aid of it, conditioned upon the ratification
taking place.'
We are of the opinion that the Legislature may pass an act to
take effect only upon the adoption of a constitutional amendment
authorizing it, and that its constitutionality is to be tested by the
Constitution as it 5is4 at the time the law takes effect, and not as
when it was passed.

The rationale of the court appears to have been that the
constitutionality of a statute must be determined under the conOpinion of the Justices, 237 A.2d 400 (Me. 1968); In re Opinion of the

Justices, 137 Me. 350, 19 A.2d 53 (1941) ; In re Opinion of the Justices,
132 Me. 519, 174 A. 845 (1933) ; City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273,
144 N.W.2d 460 (1966) ; Watson v. Miller, 55 Tex. 289 (1881).
9 In re Opinion of the Justices, 227 Ala. 296, 149 So. 781 (1933)
In re Opinion of the Justices, 227 Ala. 291, 149 So. 776 (1933) ; Alabam's
Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926); Busch v. Turner, 26
Cal. 2d 817, 161 P.2d 456 (1945); Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119 (1839);
Henson v. Georgia Industrial Realty Co 220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219
(1965)
Coguenham v. Avoca Drainage )ist., 130 La. 323, 57 So. 989
(1912)
State ex rel. State Building Commission v. Smith, 335 Mo. 840,
74 S.W.2d 27 (1934) ; Fullam v. Brock, 271 N.C. 145,' 155 S.E.2d 737
(1967) ; Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141 (1970) ; In re
Thaxton, 78 N.M. 668, 437 P.2d 129 (1968); Application of Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority, 360 P.2d 720 (Okla. 1961) ; State v. Hecker,
109 Ore. 520, 221 P. 808 (1923) ; State v. Rathie, 101 Ore. 339, 199 P. 169
(1921) ; Libby v. Olcott, 66 Ore. 124, 134 P. 13 (1913) ; Galveston, B.&C.
Narrow-Gauge R. Co. v. Gross, 47 Tex. 428 (1877).
50 Note 49 supra.

51 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926).

52 H.B. No. 227, Session Laws of 1925.
5329 Ariz. 419, 422, 242 P. 658-59 (1926).
54 Id.
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stitution in effect at the time the statute became law, and not
under the one in force at the time the act was passed by the
legislature. Although the argument seems logical on its face,
the reasoning begs the question, for it ignores the fundamental
premise that an operative constitution is a binding limitation
upon the power to legislate.5 , Absent this power, an enactment
is invalid ab initio; it is a nullity from its inception precisely because the legislature lacked the power to enact it.-' Moreover, a
superseding constitution, or an amendment to an existing one,
does not have retroactive effect; it does not give validity to legislation a general assembly initially lacked the power to enact. 7
Given these criteria, the only logical inference that can be drawn
is that the determination of constitutionality must not be premised upon the time when a statute purports to become effective,
but rather upon the power of the legislative body to lawfully
legislate at the time it undertakes to act. 5s While the enactment
of legislation to take effect only upon the happening of some future event or contingency has been held to be a proper exercise
of legislative discretion;"5 in each case the legislation was constitutional when passed. The upholding of unconstitutional
enactments, however, dependent for their legality solely upon as
uncertain an event as the electoral ratification of a proposed constitutional revision, 0 represents a substantial departure from
traditional concepts of constitutional law. For even though the
legislative powers possessed by a state legislature are as broad
and comprehensive as are necessary to accomplish the legitimate
5 Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667 (1872) ;
Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Saylor, 5 Cal. 3d 685, 97 Cal. Rptr. 1,
488 P.2d 161 (1971) ; Monington v. Turner, 251 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1971);
North Shore Post No. 21 of American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231,
230 N.E.2d 833 (1967); Wall v. Harrison, 201 Kan. 600, 443 P.2d 266
(1968) ; Joint Legislative Committee of Legislature v. Strain, 263 La. 488,
268 So. 2d 629 (1972) ; Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 255
N.W. 579 (1934); Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 223 Tenn. 415, 446
S.W.2d 260 (1969).
56 Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566 (1913)
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) ; Ex parte Royall, 117
U.S. 241, 248 (1886).
5 Porto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 469 (1934)
Fleming v. Hance, 153 Cal. 162, 94 P. 620 (1908) ; People v. Frencavage,
233 Mich. 369, 206 N.W. 567 (1925) ; Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy
v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940); Robert Realty Co. v. City
of Orange, 103 N.J.L. 711, 139 A. 54 (1927) ; Ursuline Academy v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 141 Ohio St. 563, 49 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
58 Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401
(Fla. 1970) ; City of Atlanta v.
Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960) ; Grasso v. Kucharski, 93 Il.
App. 2d 233, 236 N.E.2d 262 (1968) ; Boeing Company v. State, 74 Wash. 2d
82, 442 P.2d 970 (1968) ; State ex rel. Commissioners of Public Lands v.
Anderson, 56 Wis. 2d 666, 203 N.W.2d 84 (1973).
59 Note 46 supra.
60In Illinois, out of six proposed constitutions two were rejected by the
electorate. Out of thirty-six proposed amendments to the 1870 Constitution,
twenty-one were rejected by the people.
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purposes of government,"' such lawmaking powers are effectively
inhibited by the restraints which the people have imposed by way
of constitutional limitation. 2 Not until the people have ratified the
proposed changes to the constitution may the legislature enact
legislation which is beyond its present constitutional authority. 3
An alternative solution to the problem has been taken by
a number of jurisdictions by the imposition of procedural safeguards for the enactment of anticipatory legislation. The view
taken by these courts has been that anticipatory legislation is
within the lawmaking power of a general assembly only if enacted after the proposed constitutional revisions have been for4
mally ratified and are therefore certain to become effective.
THE ILLINOIS VIEW,

A

SECOND CHANCE AT UNIFORMITY

The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this alternative position
in Ogilvie, holding that the Transportation Bond Act, enacted
after the 1970 Constitution had been ratified, was to have its

constitutionality determined under the new charter.6 5 The court
distinguished between anticipatory legislation enacted prior to
ratification of an enabling constitutional provision and legislation enacted after ratification but before the enabling provision

became effective.66 In the court's opinion, enactment under the
latter circumstances was within the plenary lawmaking power of
the General Assembly unless anticipatory legislation, as such,
is specifically prohibited by the constitution.The procedural
distinction is well founded. Both the 1870 and 1970 Constitutions
vested the power to legislate in the Illinois General Assembly.66
Since this power is plenary, 9 the General Assembly may validly
legislate on any subject so long as it is not prohibited from doing
so by either the Federal or state Constitutions. 7 8 Where that
"I Sun Insurance Office Limited v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961);
Department of Public Works and Buildings v. McNeal, 33 Ill. 2d 248, 211
N.E.2d 266 (1965); Buras v. Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 248 La. 203, 177 So. 2d 576 (1965) ; Moses Lake School Dist. No.
161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wash. 2d 551, 503 P.2d 86 (1972).
62 Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 466 P.2d 18 (1970);
Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947); Young v. City
of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 255 N.W. 579 (1934); Thomas v. Kingsley,
85 N.J. Super. 357, 204 A.2d 724 (1964); Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219,
72 S.E.2d 506 (1952).
63 For an excellent discussion of the subject see Justice Souris' dissenting opinion in Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460
(1966).
64 Note 48 supra.
65 49 Ill. 2d 476, 484, 274 N.E.2d 87, 93 (1971).
66 Id.
at 483, 274 N.E.2d at 93 (1971).
67

Id.

66

ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1970); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1870).

69 North Shore Post No. 21 of American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231,

230 N.E.2d 853 (1967); People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77,
64 N.E.2d 4 (1945) ; People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N.E. 419
(1932).
70 Droste v. Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495, 217 N.E.2d 73 (1966) ; Locust Grove
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prohibition is removed, however, either by constitutional amendment or superseding constitution, it follows that the General
Assembly may thereafter constitutionally legislate on the previously prohibited subject matter. Given these criteria, the
question remains as to whether the General Assembly may anticipate the removal of constitutional limitations and enact a
valid law to take effect only upon the removal of such limitations.
The Illinois Supreme Court, consistent with the decisive utterance
in Druggan, answered the question affirmatively, holding that so
long as anticipatory legislation is not per se unconstitutional, the
General Assembly may, by virtue of its plenary lawmaking
power, enact legislation to anticipate the removal of constitutional prohibitions where such removal had already been authorized by the people and was thus certain to become effective in due
time." The rationale for this statement is that since a constitution is the unfettered creation of the people, 7" only the people may
effect the removal of constitutional limitations upon the General
Assembly's power to legislate. Where the enabling constitutional
revision has not yet been ratified by the people, it is axiomatic
that the General Assembly lacks the constitutional capacity to legislate upon the subject-matter and the legislation cannot constitutionally stand, since legislative enactments must be judged in
the light of the power possessed by the legislature at the time it
73
undertakes to act.
The holding in Ogilvie marks an effective and appropriate
solution to the conflict created by the period of transition between an old and a new constitution. While recognizing the
practical necessity for enacting anticipatory legislation in order
to insure an efficient transition between the two,7 4 the Ogilvie
solution also provides a workable procedure for the enactment of
anticipatory legislation which is consistent with intrinsic principles of constitutional law. The acknowledgment of the fact
that popular ratification of a proposed constitution is indispensable to invest the legislature with the power to anticipate future
constitutional guidelines is consistent with the principle that the
power to legislate stems solely from the electorate ;75 for the peoCemetery Ass'n of Philo v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 156 N.E.2d 577 (1959);
People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Barnett, 373 Ill. 393, 26 N.E.2d 478
(1940) ; Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Winslow, 317 Ill. 25, 147 N.E. 401
(1925).
7149 Ill. 2d 476, 483-84, 274 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1971).
72McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819);
Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 138 N.E. 849 (1923); City of Chicago v.
Chicago Ball Club, 196 Ill. 54, 63 N.E. 695 (1902) ; City of Beardstown v.
City of Virginia, 76 Ill. 34 (1875); 1 COOLEY,

353-54 (8th ed. 1927); SCHWARTZ,

(1955).
7 Note 58 supra.
7 Note 9 supra.
75 ILL. CONST.

art. IV,
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ple alone have the alternative of accepting or rejecting the document upon which the power to govern finds its genesis.7 6 In an
area too long governed by uncertainty and controversy, Ogilvie
provides a practical procedure by which the Illinois General Assembly may insure the constitutionality of enactments intended
to take effect upon the effective date of superseding constitutional
provisions. The holding becomes particularly important in light
of the more liberal provisions relating to amendment and constitutional revision under the 1970 Constitution.'
For although
it is unlikely that the 1970 Constitution will be substantially revised in the foreseeable future, questions relating to anticipatory
legislation are likely to arise as a result of the more flexible
provisions relating to constitutional amendment under the new
charter.
CONCLUSION

In Ogilvie, the Illinois Supreme Court faced the questions
raised by the enactment of anticipatory legislation for the first
time. The court held that the passage of legislation in anticipation of the removal of constitutional limitations was within
the plenary lawmaking power of the General Assembly, provided
the enabling constitutional provisions had been previously ratified by the electorate and were therefore certain to become effective.
In sanctioning the enactment of anticipatory legislation in
Illinois, Ogilvie delineates the procedure which must be adhered
to by the General Assembly in order to insure that the legislation
will meet the tests of constitutionality in the courts. Legislative
procedure in the enactment of anticipatory legislation in Illinois
becomes, under Ogilvie, a determinative factor in the success or
failure of such legislation to accomplish its intended purposes.
The decision represents an effective attempt by the court to
reconcile the conflict created between binding constitutional limitations upon the lawmaking power of the General Assembly and
the necessity for enacting anticipatory legislation in order to insure an effective transition between an old and a new constitution. Hopefully, Ogilvie will be instrumental in marking an end
to the confusion which has attended the enactment of anticipatory legislation in other states for so many years.
Louis Xiques
The legislative power is vested in a General Assembly consisting
of a Senate and a House of Representatives elected by the electors from
59 Legislative Districts.
See also ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1870) ; ILL. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1848)
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1818).
76 McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819).
77 ILL. CONST. art. XIV (1970).
Compare ILL. CONST. art. XIV (1870).

